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Ariel Sharon and the Jordan Option

Gary Sussman

March 2005

(Gary Sussman is based at Tel Aviv University.)

An avid enthusiast of Ariel Sharon and his unilateral disengagement plan recently opined that the plan “has one inborn defect: it has no vision, has no diplomatic horizon and is devoid of any ideological dimension.”[1] This view of the Israeli prime minister — tactically brilliant but lacking as a strategic thinker — is common but mistaken. Sharon clearly belongs in the pantheon of master tacticians in modern politics, but he does indeed have a long-term strategy — and disengagement fits right in.His vision is no longer the creation of limited Palestinian state on some 50 percent of the West Bank, as many have long assumed. Instead, Sharon envisions a Palestinian state on a significant portion of the West Bank, possibly as much as 80 percent. Sharon is all too aware that such an entity is not “viable.” He assumes, in fact, that a two-state arrangement cannot be sustained and will not bring an end to Palestinian-Israeli strife.In the long term, the Israeli premier hopes that the Palestinian state will meld with Jordan. His assumption is that unilateral disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, his plan for a carefully managed transition away from direct Israeli rule over the majority of the Palestinians, will set this process in motion. Over time, Sharon calculates, contiguity between “Palestine” and its neighbor to the east, as well as increased trade, cultural ties and the “democratization” championed by the Bush administration, will induce Palestinians on both the West and East Banks of the Jordan to agitate for Palestinian-Jordanian federation themselves. If one assumes that Sharon has quietly held on to his once openly expressed belief that “Jordan is Palestine,” his break with his old supporters among the settler movements and the right becomes easier to understand.

Sharon’s Intentions

Politicians are far more forthright than we believe. They very often mean what they say. If one, for example, reads former South African President F. W. de Klerk’s speeches from 1989 until well into the negotiations process that eventually ended apartheid, one is struck by how candidly he set out his agenda. De Klerk sought to impose a limited democracy, blunting universal democracy with significant guarantees for the white minority. He hoped to do so by controlling the pace and scope of the transition. He also believed that he could outsmart the African National Congress, which he assumed to be significantly weakened by the collapse of its patron, the Soviet Union. In a similar way, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to engineer a process that ensured the perpetuation of Soviet-style communism, albeit reformed. That perestroika and Pretoria-stroika failed to secure their objectives is, of course, another matter entirely.

Given that Sharon is keen to avoid a withdrawal on the scale of the Geneva blueprint, the critical — and still unanswered — question is what his red lines for a withdrawal are. His spokesperson Raanan Gissin notes that his plan “will remove the issue of other major evacuations, major withdrawals in Judea and Samaria, particularly the major clusters of settlements.” The plan, as Gissin notes, leaves Israel “the most vital percentages that we need.” Sharon has long held that Israel requires greater “strategic depth” and can attain it through establishing “security zones” — swathes of occupied territory from which Israel would not withdraw. Clarifying the nature of the zones, Gissin suggests that “there will be an eastern security zone and a western security zone: the eastern 10-15 kilometers and the western 3-5 kilometers from the 1967 borders.” Pressed to quantify the percentage of the West Bank left to the Palestinians, Gissin confirms that it would be 58 percent.[11] Sharon’s former national security adviser, Ephraim Halevy, corroborates this percentage,[12] as does journalist Ben Kaspit, who detailed Sharon’s strategy days before the December 2003 Herzliya speech in which he first laid it out.[13] In the widely cited Haaretz interview in which he used the term “formaldehyde,” Weisglass intimated that disengagement will ensure that 190,000 [of 240,000] settlers “will not be moved from their place.” Relocating 50,000 settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza (the figure of 240,000 excludes settlers residing in East Jerusalem and its surroundings) will leave Israel still controlling a significant portion of the West Bank. Such a withdrawal would roughly conform to the plan proposed in July 1967 by Gen. Yigal Allon, who was then deputy prime minister in a Labor government. The aforementioned interviews would, therefore, confirm what many critics have long assumed about Sharon’s intentions.

Eyval Giladi, on the other hand, speculated further that the final figure for “West Bank territory on the western side of the barrier will be a fraction below 10 percent.”[14] That percentage was corroborated by Ehud Olmert, then deputy prime minister and now serving in the new position of vice prime minister.[15] The trajectory of the separation barrier adopted by the Israeli cabinet on February 20, 2005 also points in this direction (see map).

Reframing the Conflict

Sharon’s first objective is to create a subservient Palestinian state with provisional borders and then seek to limit subsequent territorial concessions to that state. A Palestinian state with provisional borders is promised by phase two of the road map. In contrast to the Palestinians, however, Sharon seeks to avoid phase three of the road map for as long as possible. Weisglass conceded that Sharon embraced unilateral disengagement only when it became apparent that there was no Palestinian partner for an interim arrangement that postpones phase three. Arafat’s refusal to accept this idea underpinned Israel’s efforts to marginalize him. In Sharon’s eyes, a limited Palestinian state, where the maximum number of Palestinians lives on the minimum amount of land, is a strategic asset. Such a statelet improves Israel’s hand in final status negotiations, because the conflict can be more easily portrayed as a disagreement between two sovereign states. Israel will no longer have to deal with the PLO, which represents the refugees. As Azmi Bishara explains,There is a vast difference between negotiating a final settlement with a state and with a national liberation movement. Dozens of states have borders disputes; there is nothing particularly urgent or unsettling about them, unlike national liberation causes. Sharon has no intention of broaching the latter, and the Palestinians will forfeit the opportunity to broach them too if they accept the creation of a state outside the framework of a just, comprehensive and permanent solution, a state amputated at its inception and that Sharon intends to make the permanent solution.[16]

Living with a Limited Palestinian State

Sharon appreciates that something the White House will call “a Palestinian state” is a given. He is now trying to create greater domestic and international consensus for a limited Palestinian state — though one much larger than Sharon’s detractors are prepared to admit. He will even acquiesce in greater sovereignty for the Palestinian entity than his predecessors may have been willing to do. One might call his current project “the 20 percent (of the West Bank for Israel) coalition.” In other words, he seeks to realign Israeli positions on the Palestinian issue around borders he considers vital to Israel. His unilateral measures, therefore, are a way of repackaging the notion of the two-state solution. Seen from his perspective, such an approach is rational. Sharon, after all, believes that a negotiated peace like the one spelled out in the Geneva accord will not resolve the conflict.

The Jordan Option?

It is worth recalling that the “Jordan option” — whereby a Palestinian entity federates with Jordan — was the endgame that Sharon espoused when he entered politics in 1974. For many years, he vocally supported the removal of the “artificial kingdom” in Jordan.[27] At least one prominent Jordanian believes that the Israeli premier’s tactical maneuvering should be evaluated in the light of his past predilections. When he was still foreign minister, current Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher noted, “We are afraid that the day might come when Israeli leaders might argue ‘Jordan is Palestine.’ Why are we worried? The wall will effectively divide the West Bank into three parts. It will make life impossible for Palestinians: dividing them from their work, their schools, their lands. If that happens, what options do Palestinians have? They will leave, voluntarily or by force, for Jordan.”[28]

Indeed, a variant of the idea, euphemistically labeled as the “regional solution,” enjoys support in the Israeli security establishment. Press reports intimate that Giora Eiland, head of the National Security Council, has presented the “regional” option to Sharon. Besides receiving a favorable response from the premier, Eiland has a mandate to present the plan to the international community.[29] The salient difference between the current Israel Defense Forces command and the ex-general Sharon is that the former fancy that such an accommodation can be negotiated. The more prudent Sharon appreciates that neither the Palestinians nor Israel’s neighbors will agree to the idea.

In order for Amman to become the “new Jerusalem,” Israel would need to connect the two territories by giving up the Jordan River Valley.

[1] Ari Shavit, “Year of Truth,” Haaretz, December 30, 2004.

[2] Haaretz, July 21, 2004.

[3] Avi Shlaim, “Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians,” Logos 3/3 (Summer 2004).

[4] Quoted in Colin Shindler, The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, the Likud and the Zionist Dream (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 285.

[5] Haaretz, July 13, 2004.

[6] Haaretz, December 31, 2004.

[7] Haaretz, April 13, 2004.

[8] Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze,” Haaretz, October 8, 2004.

[9] Jerusalem Post, September 9, 2004; Yediot Aharonot, April 5, 2004; Haaretz, April 5, 2004; Haaretz, April 13, 2004; Haaretz, June 7, 2004.

[11] Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2005.

[12] Jerusalem Post, December 31, 2004.

[13] Ben Kaspit, “Sharon’s Plan,” Ma’ariv, December 5, 2003.

[14] Jerusalem Post, November 25, 2004.

[15] Makor Rishon, May 14, 2004.

[16] Azmi Bishara, “Palestinian State as Israeli Demand,” al-Ahram Weekly, December 23-29, 2004.

[17] Ari Shavit, “Apocalypse Now,” Haaretz, January 28, 2005.

[18] Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2004.

[19] Haaretz, April 13, 2004.

[20] Aluf Benn, “Demographic Politics,” Haaretz, February 2, 2004.

[22] Makor Rishon, May 14, 2004.

[23] Gideon Levy, “Don’t Disengage,” Haaretz, April 18, 2004.

[24] Bret Stephens, “Toilets in the Sand,” Jerusalem Post, September 3, 2004.

[25] David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 225.

[26] Joseph Strayer quoted in Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank (Ithaca, 1993), p. 38

[28] Washington Post, January 30, 2004.

[29] Haaretz, June 4, 2004.

[30] Marc Lynch, “No Jordan Option,” Middle East Report Online, June 21, 2004.

[31] Salim Tamari, “The Dubious Lure of Binationalism,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30/1 (Autumn 2000).